Is there an “Axis of Evil”? Are North Korea and Iran unique threats to not only the United States but the world at large? Yes and no. The Iraq war finished what the conflict in Kosovo began: with no Cold War to define their existence, traditional alliances such as NATO and international bodies such as the UN have lost their identity vis a vis the U.S. What makes the “Axis of Evil” special is not its collective threat to the United States, but its potential to forcibly realign American allegiances.
In the long run, relationships with India and China will be more important, with the exception of the UK, than today’s trans-Atlantic focus. Europe has committed fully, with mixed results, to unification. French fears of a pro-American Trojan horse on its far eastern flank will die down as those nations, despite some abstract pro-American sentimentality, realize their futures lie with the European continent. For better or worse, the EU, on all fronts, has staked out its own claims and made its own decisions, not just independent of the U.S., but sometimes in direct opposition to it. French insistence on maintaining ties to Arafat while calling for Israel’s unilateral implementation of “The Roadmap” is one example.
ÿYet, this is a transitional stage because the U.S. has no better ally yet. With its increasing business ties to the U.S., its democratic institutions, and its strategically significant location, India is enticing as an ally. Unfortunately, India also votes against the U.S. in the UN over 80% of the time. Moreover, with a “creeping protectionism” evident in many of Bush’s trade policies, tensions have emerged with the subcontinent. Americans have deep concerns about high tech jobs being drained to India and have begun to call for action.
More problems exist between the U.S. and China. China has the world’s third-largest GDP, behind the U.S., and the Euro-zone, at $6 trillion; not long from now, China could be our largest trading partner. China is also located in a traditionally crucial area for U.S. interests. Economic ties and a largely American-friendly populace have prevented disagreements such as the Hainan spy-plane incident and the sale of “silk worm” missiles to Iraq (which killed an American soldier in combat) from boiling over.ÿ However, such goodwill cannot eliminate past and future tensions that likely will be harder to contain. While Bush supports democratic Taiwan, China provides North Korea nearly all of its aid.
This brings us back to the “Axis”; with Russian support, Iran will possess a nuclear weapon if nothing is done. The EU has condemned this possibility, but has done little to empower the International Atomic Energy Agency to hinder such progress. Neither can temper cash-strapped Russia’s enthusiasm to make the sale. Also, neither body is willing to support America’s regional ally, Israel, in any sort of preventative measure like its strike on Iraqi facilities in the early ’80s. Iran thus will force the U.S. to seek out other allies, however unable or unwilling they are to align with the U.S. India is in a perpetual standoff with Pakistan over Kashmir, and cannot afford to overtly support an outright attack against Muslim territory, nor can it expend meaningful diplomatic capital toward such a goal.
North Korea, a threat more to our regional allies than the U.S. itself, has forced the U.S. to attempt to forge an uneasy alliance with China in the hopes of peaceful resolution for the sake of Seoul and Japan. Yet, while it has made dramatic strides post-Tiananmen, China still frames its foreign policy solely in terms of its singular interests. With anti-American sentiment on the rise in South Korea and the Japan asking for more responsibility for its own defense, America has been pushed away from strengthening ties to these long time friends in favor of relations with a long-time adversary.
None of this is likely to change for years. The U.S. and the EU have different visions; the U.S. is not prepared or able to fully develop ties with India and China. The “Axis of Evil” and the challenges it presents threaten not the existence of the U.S., but the existence of a viable, meaningful network of nations at a time when it can be least afforded. With allies if possible, unilateral if necessary, Bush’s handling-not his labeling-of the “Axis” will be the measure of his presidency and that of any would be successor.